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BLIND JUSTICE: THE NEED TO INTRODUCE DIVERSE
PERSPECTIVES INTO OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
Edward H. Richardson
I. INTRODUCTION
Peggy Young was finally pregnant.' This was the third time that
she attempted in vitro fertilization. The first time, in 2005, the
procedure was successful, but Young suffered a miscarriage.3 The
second attempt at in vitro fertilization, in February 2006, failed. The
third round, in July of 2006, was a success.' Each time that Young
underwent an in vitro fertilization attempt, she requested, and
received, a leave of absence from her job at United Parcel Service
(UPS). 6
But what should have been a joyous occasion-a pregnancy
resulting in the birth of Young's daughter Triniti7-turned into a
battle with UPS that went all the way to the Supreme Court.' UPS
refused to accommodate Young's health needs during her pregnancy,
compelling her to take an extended unpaid leave of absence, which in
turn caused her to lose her health coverage.9  UPS' refusal to
accommodate Young came despite its policies accommodating other,
non-pregnant, employees in similar situations. 0 Young filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as a
result of UPS' treatment," and, later, filed a charge with the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland. 2 Both charges
1. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *4 (D.
Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
2. Id. at *3-4.
3. Id. at *3.
4. Id. at *4.
5. Id.
6. Id at *3-4.
7. Brigid Schulte, Former UPS Driver at Center of Pregnancy Discrimination Case
Before Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.co
m/local/former-ups-driver-at-center-of-pregnancy-discrimination-case-before-
supreme-court/2014/11/30/5a08c048-7787-1 1e4-bdlb-03009bd3e984_storyhtmil.
8. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.
10. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
11. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *6.
12. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW
alleged that UPS discriminated against Young based on her gender
and pregnancy. 3
Unfortunately for Young, the lower federal courts agreed with UPS
when it came to pregnancy accommodations. 4 The courts, including
both the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 5 ruled
against Young. ' 6 Finding that there had been no discrimination based
on gender or pregnancy, both courts repeatedly deferred to UPS'
"pregnancy-blind policies." 7  These holdings implied that
discrimination is fine as long as policy-makers pretend that there are
no differences between the way society treats men and women.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the case, calling on the
Fourth Circuit to determine whether UPS' reasons for treating Young
differently from similarly situated non-pregnant employees was
merely pretext.'8 This was a step in the right direction, but it is
unclear whether the ruling indicates a real change for the better, or is
merely an outlier in recent jurisprudence. 9
Pregnancy-blind policies, and similarly-termed "gender-neutral"
policies,2 ° like those espoused by the lower courts in Young's case,
only serve to maintain the status quo. Take, for example, Santa Clara
County, California, where women made up 36.4% of the labor force
in 1987.21 In Santa Clara at the time, the Transportation Agency
employed a workforce composed of only 22.4% women,22 lower than
the overall distribution in the labor pool. Within the Agency, women
largely occupied positions adhering to gender stereotypes, such as
office and clerical workers. 3 If one were to assess the situation,
keeping gender in mind, one could reasonably come to the conclusion
13. Id.; see also discussion infra Parts III.B. 1-2.
14. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1-2.
15. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013).
16. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1-2.
17. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
18. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356 (2015).
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
20. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *11-12
(D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
21. These numbers come from Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480
U.S. 616, 621 (1987), a case discussed in significantly more detail later. See infra
notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
22. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
23. Id. ("[W]omen made up 76% of Office and Clerical Workers, but only 7.1% of
Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6% of Professionals, 9.7% of Technicians,
and 22% of Service and Maintenance Workers.").
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that there was a "manifest imbalance" along gender lines,24 which the
Agency could correct by increasing the percentage of women it hired
in male-dominated positions. 25  A person adopting a gender-neutral
perspective, on the other hand, would see the situation as perfectly
reasonable, so long as the company had no policies specifically
preventing women from being placed in the male-dominated
positions.26 While ostensibly treating women equally, the results of
gender-neutral policies in such a situation would be the continued
dominance of males in certain jobs.
The preference for gender-neutral policies, 27 while a creation of
more recent jurisprudence, is merely the latest in a long legacy of
judicial holdings that reinforce traditional gender roles.28 Courts
largely fail to recognize that gender is a social construct:29 one which
changes and evolves over time. Less than 150 years ago, Justice
Bradley wrote that "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother[,]" 30 a
statement that modem Americans would likely find to be archaic and
sexist. And yet, the underlying adherence to normative social ideas
of that time still exists today: women are still perceived, to at least
some extent, as child-bearers, while men are afforded more freedom
and agency.31
In order to combat this attitude, courts must take care to adopt
women's perspectives. Justices need to be cognizant of the United
States' legal and social history that produced the disadvantaged
position in which women still find themselves today. Judges should
think critically, asking whether their holdings produce equal results,
and not just hypothetically equal treatment. Gender-neutral policies,
by definition, are incapable of showing sensitivity towards our
nation's history of gender discrimination. As Justice Ginsburg
explained in United States v. Virginia, "'[i]nherent differences'
24. Id. at 631.
25. See id at 642 ("Such a plan... embodies the contribution that voluntary employer
action can make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.").
26. See Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 2011 WL 665321, at
*11 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011) (holding that pregnancy-blind policy cannot serve as
evidence of discrimination).
27. As exhibited not only in Young's case, but in cases like Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001). See discussion infra Part IV.C.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See infra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
30. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., infra notes 277-88 and accompanying text.
32. See discussion infra Part V.
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between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause
for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex
or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity."33
This comment will proceed in four parts following this
introduction. Part II describes the legal background underpinning the
Young decision. Part III discusses the facts and procedural history of
Young's case. It covers the District Court's ruling, dividing it into
analyses of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. It also illustrates the Court of Appeals'
holding, and explains the Supreme Court's ultimate judgment.
Part IV provides an extended genealogy of the American justice
system's evolving attitudes towards gender. It begins with an
analysis of the Supreme Court's rulings on gender prior to the 1970s.
It goes on to survey the Court's great leaps forward in the latter
quarter of the 20th century. The genealogy finishes by looking at
some recent cases, including the Supreme Court's holding in Young
v. UPS. Finally, Part V contextualizes developing attitudes towards
gender in the law using the social sciences and offers suggestions on
how courts should proceed. Throughout this comment, courts' prior
decisions and future directions are analyzed and critiqued in light of
the need to keep diverse perspectives in mind in order to achieve true
gender equality.
II. BACKGROUND
Young's lawsuit against UPS asserted violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),3 4 as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).35 Congress passed the PDA, in
33. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
34. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015). Title VII, in
relevant part, states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
35. Id. § 2000e(k).
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part, as a response to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,36 which held
that "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk,
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk
does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men
and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded
inclusion of risks."37 The PDA includes pregnancy in the definition
of sex discrimination which is proscribed by Title VII.38 With the
PDA, Congress intended to ensure that "women as capable of doing
their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose
between having a child and having a job."3 9 The PDA does not
prohibit favorable treatment of pregnancy.4° It also clarifies that
treating pregnancy-related conditions with disfavor relative to other
medical conditions is discrimination.4'
Under the PDA, "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes.., as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work ... *"42 A plaintiff can
establish a pregnancy discrimination claim by showing, either
directly or by circumstantial evidence, that pregnancy discrimination
motivated her employer's actions.43  Alternatively, she can
demonstrate "pretext" by establishing a "prima facie case of
discrimination" and then demonstrating that the employer's actions
are actually a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.44
Young also brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA),45 which prohibits "discriminat[ion] against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. '46  The ADA further
proscribes an employer from requiring medical examinations of
employees to determine whether the individual has a disability, or to
determine the severity of any disability, unless the examination is job
36. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987).
37. 429 U.S. 125, 139 (1976).
38. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 284.
39. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
40. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 286-87.
41. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
43. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004).
44. Id. at 285.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-11213 (2012).
46. Id. § 12112(a).
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related or results from a business necessity. 47 Congress found the
passage of the ADA to be necessary in order to address persistent
discrimination against individuals with disabilities that resulted in
"society... tend[ing] to isolate and segregate [those] individuals. '48
The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment."49 It further defines "major
life activities" as "includ[ing], but ...not limited to, caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working."50 In
applying the ADA, courts found that a lifting restriction of 23 pounds
qualifies as a substantial limitation on the ability to engage in major
life activities.5" Courts also interpreted "disability" to cover a broad
array of physical limitations, including a heart condition which
caused labored breathing when working in high temperatures.52
III. YOUNG V. UPS
Even though Young worked for UPS for years and rarely had to
transport any heavy packages,53 UPS would not permit Young to
work as long as her pregnancy affected her ability to lift anything
over 20 pounds.54 UPS also refused to provide Young with light-duty
work during the pregnancy, despite offering light-duty assignments to
male employees with similar limitations due to medical conditions."
As a result, Young had to take an extended unpaid leave of absence
47. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
48. Id. § 12101(a)(2).
49. Id. § 12102(1)(A).
50. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
51. See, e.g., Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[B]ecause working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and because the
determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry,..
• Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least
50% of the jobs previously available to him.").
52. See, e.g., Gribben v. UPS, 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) ("There was sufficient
evidence in the record at the summary judgment proceeding to establish a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Gribben's impairment was substantial and limited
his ability to perform regular daily activities including breathing, thinking and
physical activities in temperatures of 90 degrees or more.").
53. See infra notes 68, 71-72 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 73-76, 82-86 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 76-80, 84-88 and accompanying text.
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and lost her health coverage.16 Young brought suit against UPS in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging
violations of the PDA and the ADA.57 The court found for UPS, on
the grounds that "pregnancy-blind policy" cannot be discriminatory. 8
Young appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,5 9 which also found for UPS, again ruling that UPS'
"pregnancy-blind policy" was not discriminatory.60 The court also
held that it could not expand the protections provided by Title VII.61
Young appealed again, taking her case to the Supreme Court,62 which
vacated the Fourth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case.63 It ruled
that when an "employer's policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers," and the employer's reasons for the policy "are not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden," it can create "an inference
of intentional discrimination." 64
The lower courts' adherence to pregnancy-blind policies failed to
take into account women's perspectives, and followed a long line of
court decisions that, due to an unwillingness to act or affect change
on the part of the courts, place women in a disadvantageous position
relative to men.65 The Supreme Court's decision, while encouraging,
only briefly and obliquely addressed the issue of gender-neutral
policy,66  and never conclusively determined whether UPS
discriminated against Young on the basis of her pregnancy.
67
A. Facts of the Case
Young worked at UPS for seven years leading up to her
pregnancy.68 UPS originally hired her in 1999, and she became a
driver in 2002.69 At the time of her pregnancy, Young worked as an
56. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
59. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 446.
61. Id. at451.
62. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338
(2015) (No. 12-1226).
63. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356 (2015).
64. Id. at 1354.
65. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
66. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.
67. Id. at 1356.
68. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *1 (D.
Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
69. Id.
2016
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air driver, delivering packages shipped via air carrier.70 While air
drivers typically did not deliver heavy packages, UPS still required
its air drivers to be able to move packages weighing up to 70
pounds.7' Young was largely able to circumvent the lifting
requirements without interfering with her ability to deliver packages:
air delivery is more expensive than ground delivery, so heavier
packages are rarely sent by air; Young had access to a hand truck to
help move heavier packages; and other drivers would sometimes
deliver heavier packages for her.72
Despite the ease with which drivers could get around the weight
requirements, UPS still expected employees who could not perform
such an "essential function" of their job due to off-the-job
circumstances to take a leave of absence.73  UPS considered
pregnancy to be an off-the-job condition.74 While UPS permitted
pregnant employees to continue to work, if an employee presented a
doctor's note detailing the medical restrictions that interfered with
her ability to fulfill the essential functions of her job, she had to take
a leave of absence. 75 Each time Young underwent a round of in vitro
fertilization, she complied with this requirement.76
UPS allowed employees to take on temporary light-duty
assignments,77 but only when the employees were unable to perform
their jobs due to an on-the-job injury,78 were suffering from a
qualifying ADA recognized disability,79 or failed a Department of
Transportation (DOT) medical exam. 0 Pregnant employees, per
UPS' policies, did not qualify for light-duty assignments.8'
Despite the pregnancy, Young's midwife, Cynthia Shawl, gave her
permission to return to work in October 2006.82 However, Shawl
70. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013).
71. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *1.
72. Id. After the second round of attempted in vitro fertilization, Carol Richardson, the
other driver on Young's route, volunteered to deliver all of the heavier packages for
Young due to concerns with Young's health. 1d. at *4.
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Young took leaves of absence from July
2005 to October 2005, Young, 2011 WL 14266, at *3, February to March 2006, id. at
*4, and in July 2006, id.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id. at*2.
82. Id. at *5.
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wrote a note recommending that Young not lift more than 20 pounds
as a result of her pregnancy.83 Young requested that UPS allow her
to return to work, but disclosed the note from Shawl and asked
whether she could be assigned light-duty work due to her
pregnancy. 84  Carolyn Martin, UPS' District Occupational Health
Manager for Young's region, was responsible for determining
whether Young could return to work and whether she qualified for
light-duty assignments.85 Martin refused to permit Young to return to
her air driver position due to the weight requirements for that job.86
Martin further decided that pregnancy did not qualify Young for
light-duty work. 7 According to Martin, she wanted to help Young,
but the UPS policy required her to "treat [Young] like [she] would
treat anybody who had a note for lifting and couldn't do their regular
job."88 Had Young provided Martin with a note stating that Young
was entirely unable to work, Young would have been eligible for
disability, but that was not the case.89
Young also alleged that she spoke to her supervisor, Myron
Williams, about returning to work. 90 Williams lacked authority to
permit Young to resume her job.9' Nevertheless, Williams allegedly
told Young "not to come back in the building until [she] was no
longer pregnant because [she] was too much of a liability. 92
Unable to return to her normal job or take on a light-duty
assignment, Young had to extend her leave of absence.93 Because
Young had already exhausted her medical leave, UPS did not pay her
during her leave of absence and she lost her medical coverage. 94 On
April 29, 2007, 91 Young gave birth to Triniti,96 and on June 26, 2007,
she returned to her job at UPS. 97
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Id. at *4-5.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id.
92. Id. Williams denies ever making this statement. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Schulte, supra note 7.
97. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *6. Young delayed her return to work in order to have a
maternity leave and in order to better be prepared "physically [and] emotionally" to
perform her job. Id.
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B. Procedural History
1. The District Court's Approval of a Pregnancy-Blind Policy
Young filed a charge with the EEOC on July 23, 2007. 98 She
alleged that UPS discriminated against her based on her gender and
pregnancy. 99 The EEOC issued a right to sue letter, and Young filed
suit against UPS in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland on October 3, 2008.100 Her lawsuit asserted violations of
both the PDA 1'0 and ADA. 102
a. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In arguing that direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination existed,
as required by the PDA, 03 Young offered Williams' alleged remarks
that she "was too much of a liability." 10 4 While derogatory remarks
can constitute evidence of discrimination under some circumstances,
a plaintiff cannot demonstrate discrimination through "stray or
isolated" remarks unless the remarks "were related to the
employment decision in question."'0 5  Because Williams was
Young's supervisor but had no authority to supersede Martin's
decisions regarding accommodations,0 6 the court held that his
remarks could not be "related to the employment decision in
question."'17  The United States District Court of Maryland also
found that Williams' remarks were isolated, as there was insufficient
evidence to indicate that a pervasive corporate culture of
discrimination existed at UPS.108
Young also suggested that UPS' requirement that she produce a
doctor's note to prove that her pregnancy physically limited her,'0 9
along with UPS' policy denying light-duty assignments to pregnant
women, constituted direct evidence of discrimination. 01 However,
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
102. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *7.
103. See supra notes 43--44 and accompanying text.
104. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *10.
105. Eruanga v. Grafton Sch., 181 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting Brinkley
v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999)) (internal citations
omitted).
106. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *10.
107. Eruanga, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 521; see also Young, 2011 WL 665321, at * 10.
108. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *11.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the District Court ruled that no direct evidence of pregnancy
discrimination existed, "[b]ecause UPS determines whether
accommodations will be offered on ...gender-neutral criteria, [so
the policy is] at least on its face a 'neutral and legitimate business
practice."''" Citing an analogous Sixth Circuit case, the District
Court held that UPS' policy "simply does not grant or deny light
work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions" and that such a "pregnancy-blind policy, therefore,
cannot serve as direct evidence of... alleged discrimination."'12
In the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, Young attempted to make the argument that UPS'
policies were merely a pretext for discrimination." 3  To make the
pretext argument, Young first had to "establish a 'prima facie' case of
discrimination."" 4 In order to do this, Young needed to demonstrate
that "(1) she [was] a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the job and performed it satisfactorily; (3) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated differently
than similarly situated employees outside of the protected class."' 15
As a pregnant woman denied light-duty, Young fulfilled the first and
third requirements." 6 As to the fourth requirement, Young needed to
demonstrate the existence of "comparators"--other employees in
similar situations whom UPS treated differently.' 17 For comparators,
Young offered examples of employees accommodated under the
ADA and under the policy accommodating drivers who failed the
DOT medical exam. 118  The District Court rejected these
comparators, holding that Young was ineligible for ADA
accommodations." 9 The court distinguished Young from the drivers
who failed their DOT medical exams, because Young suffered from a
"physical impairment" and the drivers merely suffered from a "legal
obstacle."'' 20
111. Id. at *11 (quoting Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 297 (4th
Cir. 2010)).
112. Id. at *12 (quoting Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir.
2006)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *13.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (holding that "[t]hose inabilities are dissimilar").
2016
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The District Court further ruled that, even if Young established a
prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, she would not have
been able to show that UPS' non-discriminatory explanation was
merely pretext.12' The court held that Martin genuinely believed that
Young could not perform her job, based on the doctor's note, which
sufficiently established the existence of a non-discriminatory
explanation.'22 As a result of this non-discriminatory explanation, the
court held that Young could not focus on "minor discrepancies" and
"mistakes of fact" in order to show that UPS' rationale was merely
pretext.123
b. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Young also brought suit under the ADA. 124 Young claimed that
UPS' requirement that she submit a doctor's note was discriminatory
under the ADA. 125  The ADA prohibits an entity from requiring
medical examinations that are not "job-related and consistent with
business necessity."' 26 However, the District Court ruled that, since
Young's job required lifting and moving heavy packages, the request
for a doctor's note was "job-related and consistent with business
necessity.' 1 27
Young further argued that UPS regarded her as disabled, but still
failed to offer her accommodations under the ADA.128 The District
Court ruled that, for the purposes of the ADA, "[a] person is not
[disabled] merely because she is (a) limited to lifting a few pounds or
(b) pregnant."' 129  The court also ruled that an employer is not
obligated to accommodate an employee who is merely "regarded as
disabled." 30 The court held that "[a]lthough the ADA rightfully
121. Id. at*14.
122. Id.
123. Id at *15 (quoting Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir.
2007)).
124. Id. at *7.
125. Id at*16.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).
127. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *16-17 (quoting § 12112(d)(4)(A)).
128. Id. at *17.
129. Id. at*18.
130. Id. The court conceded that there was a circuit split regarding this question. The
Fourth Circuit had not yet ruled on the question. The Fifth, Sixth, Eight, and Ninth
Circuits had previously held that employees regarded as disabled were not entitled to
an accommodation, while the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held that
employees regarded as disabled were entitled to an accommodation. Influenced by
the rulings of several District Courts in the Fourth Circuit, the court decided that the
former interpretation was better. Id.
Vol. 45
Blind Justice
intends to restore the damages 'regarded as' disabled employees
suffer because of disability discrimination, it is an entirely different
proposition to suggest that these employees deserve additional
benefits despite their lack of any actual disability." '31 The court took
the stance that it would be inappropriate to require employers to
accommodate "regarded as" employees who make it clear that they
are not, in fact, disabled.3 2  Having dispensed with both Young's
PDA claim and her ADA claim, the District Court granted UPS'
motion for summary judgment.133
2. The Court of Appeals: Not Unsympathetic, But ....
On October 24, 2012, Young challenged the District Court's grant
of summary judgment to UPS on the PDA and ADA claims in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 134 The Fourth
Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. 135  In
analyzing the PDA claim, the Court of Appeals first looked for direct
evidence of pregnancy discrimination. 136 The court held that UPS'
policy denying light-duty assignments to pregnant workers was not
direct evidence of discrimination, because "[b]y limiting
accommodations to those employees injured on the job, disabled as
defined under the ADA, and stripped of their DOT certification, UPS
has crafted a pregnancy-blind policy."'1 37  It rejected Young's
suggestion that the PDA created a cause of action distinct from sex
discrimination claims, '3 holding that interpreting the PDA in such a
way would treat pregnancy "more favorably than any other basis...
covered by Title VII."'1 39
The Court of Appeals also held that Williams' remarks did not
constitute "corporate animus," which would be necessary to
131. Id. at *19.
132. Id. "Forcing employers to accommodate 'regarded as' employees.., would 'create a
windfall for . . . employees who, after disabusing their employers of their
misconceptions [regarding their disabilities], would nonetheless be entitled to
accommodations that their similarly situated co-workers are not, for admittedly non-
disabling conditions."' Id. (quoting Weber v. Strippit, 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir.
1999)).
133. Id. at *22.
134. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013).
135. Id. at 443.
136. Id. at 446.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 446-47.
139. Id. at 447.
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demonstrate direct evidence of discrimination on the part of UPS. 140
The court found that Williams' remarks were the only instance of
pregnancy-related animus coming from UPS, and could not, on their
own, demonstrate corporate animus. 141 Furthermore, Williams lacked
the authority to make any decisions about Young's employment and
did not attempt to influence anyone who did have such authority, so
his remarks could not establish direct evidence of discrimination on
UPS' part. 142
Like the District Court below, the Court of Appeals determined that
Young could not prove a prima facie case of discrimination, because
Young could not identify appropriate comparators.1 43 It held that
comparisons to employees accommodated by the ADA, placed on
temporary light-duty due to losing DOT certification, or who suffered
on-the-job injuries were inappropriate comparators, because "these
accommodations were created by a neutral, pregnancy-blind
policy." 144
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court when it
came to the ADA claim. 45 The court held that Young could not
establish that she had a disability as defined by the ADA.146 Finding
that Young could not show that Martin subjectively believed that she
was disabled, the court determined that there was no indication that
UPS regarded Young as disabled. 147
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision
without any dissent. 148 The Fourth Circuit's opinion focused on the
fact that UPS' policies were non-discriminatory because they were
facially pregnancy-blind. 149 The court admitted sympathies towards
Young's circumstances, but indicated that it held reservations "about
the problematic potential of creating rights not grounded in the text
and structure of Title VII as a whole." 150
140. Id. at 449.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 450-51; see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
144. Young, 707 F.3d at 450.
145. Id. at 443.
146. Id. The ADA defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." ld.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012)).
147. Young, 707 F.3d at 445.
148. Id. at451.
149. See supra notes 137, 144 and accompanying text.
150. Young, 707 F.3d at 451.
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3. The Supreme Court Gives Young Another Chance
Young appealed the Fourth Circuit's ruling to the Supreme Court
on April 8, 2013.151 The Court granted the writ of certiorari on July
1, 2014, and heard oral arguments on December 3, 2014.152 In a
majority opinion written by Justice Breyer,'5 3 the Court vacated and
remanded the Fourth Circuit's ruling. 54 It found that the summary
judgment in favor of UPS was unwarranted because there was a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether UPS provided light-
duty accommodations to other employees who were similarly situated
to Young. 55
The Court relied on the same framework laid out in McDonnell
Douglas that the District Court used. 156 However, it differed on its
interpretation of that framework,'57 especially when it came to the
requirement that Young show that UPS accommodated other
employees who were similarly situated.'58 It held that a "plaintiff
may reach a jury on" the issue of whether an employer's reasons for
disparate treatment are the result of pretext "by providing sufficient
evidence that the employer's policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers" and then demonstrating that the employer's
"reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather-
when considered along with the burden imposed-give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination."' 5 9 If a plaintiff can show
"that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant
workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant
workers," then the plaintiff "create[s] a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether a significant burden exists."'6 ° It held that "a plaintiff
can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer's apparently
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for treating individuals within a
protected class differently than those outside the protected class." 16'
151. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338
(2015) (No. 12-1226).
152. Young v. United Parcel Service, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/young-v-united-parcel-service/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
153. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2015).
154. Id. at 1356.
155. Id. at 1355.
156. Id. at 1345; Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321,
at *12 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011); see supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
157. Compare Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-55 with Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *12-14.
158. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1355.
2016
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW
The plaintiff can offer the manner in which an employer applies a
policy to rebut the employer's reasons for differential treatment. 162
In this case, the Court felt that Young, at minimum, had created a
genuine issue of material fact by pointing to the numerous non-
pregnant employees who received light-duty accommodations. 163 It
remanded to the Fourth Circuit, leaving it up to the lower court to
determine whether UPS' reasons for differential treatment were
pretext for discrimination. 164 The final outcome of Young's legal
struggles still remains to be seen.
IV. A GENEOLOGY OF MALE PRIVILEGE IN THE LAW
Male privilege was ingrained in the United States' legal system
from the very beginning.165 From the language of the Constitution,166
all the way up to recent Supreme Court decisions, 167 women have
taken a backseat to men. This androcentrism is often unintentional, 168
or well-meaning, 69 but is pervasive nevertheless. 7 ' Frequently, the
courts are reluctant to make necessary changes, either denying their
ability to affect change altogether,' 7' or leaving the responsibility up
to some other party. 7 2 In essence, it comes down to an inability to
recognize artificially-constructed gender stereotypes,'73  the
interaction between law and society, 1 4 and the opportunity the justice
system has to make things better.'75 A survey of our legal history
shows that Young is the inheritor of the impact of generations of
gender discrimination that primarily male justices have foisted on
women, 176 as contemporarily encapsulated by "pregnancy-blind
policy."'1 77
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1356.
165. See discussion infra Part W.A.
166. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
167. See discussion infra Part W.C.
168. See, e.g., infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
170. See discussion infra Parts W.A-C.
171. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
172. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
173. See discussion infra Part V.
174. See infra notes 317-28 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
176. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-C.
177. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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A. An American Legal History of Preserving and Enhancing Male
Status
Peggy Young's case is just the most recent example of the manner
in which our legal system maintains male privilege. Ostensibly
designed to prevent pregnancy discrimination,'78 the language of the
PDA serves to undermine itself: "[W]omen affected by pregnancy...
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work ... ."I" Instead of providing any special protections for
pregnancy, the PDA has been interpreted such that it permits
employers to deny accommodations to pregnant employees while
granting accommodations to employees who are not pregnant, so
long as the employers can demonstrate any pregnancy-neutral
purpose for their policies, no matter how implausible. 180  This
interpretation is reflected in the rulings of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, both of which repeatedly refer to UPS' "gender- or
pregnancy-neutral" and "pregnancy-blind" policies.8 '
The concept of gender-neutral legal policy is the contemporary
inheritor of an American legal history of preserving and enhancing
male status. The genealogy of this status-protectionism can be traced
back to the founding documents of this nation: the Constitution, for
example, does not include the words "woman," "women," "female,"
178. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (emphasis added).
180. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 67, 70 (2013).
181. Young v. United States Parcel Serv. Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 450 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Young
seeks to compare herself to employees accommodated under the ADA, drivers who
have lost their DOT certification for medical reasons, and employees injured on the
job. As we have already noted, however, these accommodations were created by a
neutral, pregnancy-blind policy ...."); id. at 446 ("By limiting accommodations to
those employees injured on the job, disabled as defined under the ADA, and stripped
of their DOT certification, UPS has crafted a pregnancy-blind policy .. "); Young v.
United Parcel Serv., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *11 (D. Md. Feb. 14,
2011) ("Because UPS determines whether accommodations will be offered on these
gender-neutral criteria, it [sic] at least on its face a 'neutral and legitimate business
practice."' (quoting Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 297
(4th Cir. 2010))); id. at *12 ("[The employer's] light-duty policy is indisputably
pregnancy-blind. It simply does not grant or deny light work on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . . [The] pregnancy-blind
policy, therefore, cannot serve as direct [sic] evidence of... alleged discrimination."
(first, third, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co.,
446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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or "she." '182 It does, however, refer to elected representatives as "he"
throughout. 83  The result is a document that favors an insular,
androcentric point of view.
The Supreme Court echoed this gender elitism in some of its most
distressing cases. In Bradwell v. State,8 4 the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff, a woman from Illinois, did not have the right to practice
law.'85 It found that the federal government lacked the power to grant
women a license to practice law when such practice was prohibited
by a state, and that citizenship did not confer the right to attain a
license to practice law.'86 In a concurrence that sheds light on the
Court's mindset, Justice Bradley wrote:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The
harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband . . . . The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. 187
182. See U.S. Const.
183. Starting in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No person shall be a Representative who
shall not ... be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.") (emphasis
added) and continuing on through id. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 2, ("Thereafter, when the
President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
resume the powers and duties of his office ....") (emphasis added). This habit of
androcentrism has unfortunately continued through the centuries, and is ironically
present in Title VII, which, for example, prohibits discrimination "against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012) (emphasis added).
184. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
185. Id. at 130, 139.
186. Id. at 139.
187. Id at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Similarly, in Minor v. Happersett,188 the Court ruled that women
did not have the right to vote. 189 The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not expand the privileges or immunities of a citizen
of the United States. 190 It further held that suffrage was not among
those privileges or immunities, since it was not explicitly listed as
such in the Constitution. 191 As in Bradwell, the Court maintained that
it lacked the power to do anything about it, even if it was morally
wrong to deny women the right to vote. 192
Even when the Court attempted to enact positive social change-
despite its disavowal of its power to do such a thing' 93-it did so in a
paternalistic fashion. In Muller v. Oregon,94 the Court looked at the
constitutionality of an Oregon law that prohibited women from
working in "any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry"
more than 10 hours a day. 195 The Court found that the law was
constitutional, despite having struck down a 60-hour maximum work
week law and establishing "the right of the individual to his personal
liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may
seem to him appropriate or necessary" just three years earlier in
Lochner v. New York.'96 The Court distinguished Muller from
Lochner by emphasizing that the Oregon law specifically dealt with
women, who are "properly placed in a class by [themselves], and
legislation designed for [their] protection may be sustained, even
when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be
188. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
189. Id. at 176 ("[I]t is certainly now too late to contend that a government is not
republican, within the meaning of this guaranty in the Constitution, because women
are not made voters.").
190. Id. at 171, 175.
191. Id. at 170.
192. Id. at 178.
If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that
is not with us. The arguments addressed to us bearing upon such
a view of the subject may perhaps be sufficient to induce those
having the power, to make the alteration, but they ought not to be
permitted to influence our judgment in determining the present
rights of the parties now litigating before us. No argument as to
woman's need of suffrage can be considered.
Id.
193. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
194. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
195. Id. at416-17.
196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (emphasis added); Muller, 208 U.S. at
423.
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sustained." 197 The Court was not acting out of progressive attitudes
towards labor; it was protecting "the future well-being of the race"'198
by reinforcing women's traditional role as child-bearers. It justified
its ruling thusly:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true
when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when
they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity
continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating
this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an
object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race. 199
Almost 30 years later, even after the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920 granted women's suffrage,2 °° the Court's
paternalistic attitude towards women remained. In West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,2 ° 1 the Court looked at the constitutionality of a
Washington law establishing a minimum wage for women.20 2 A hotel
owner challenged the Washington law "as repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States, 2 °3 since it deprived women of the right of freedom
of contract.20 4 The Court held that "the protection of women is a
legitimate . . . exercise of state power" that overcomes the right of
freedom of contract.205 The Court asked, "What can be closer to the
public interest than the health of women and their protection from
unscrupulous and overreaching employers?" 206 The implication was
that women needed more state protection than men, presumably
because of some inherent deficiency. Substantial progress has been
made since these cases, and all have been overturned, but they laid
197. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 421.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
201. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
202. Id. at 386.
203. Id. at 388.
204. Id. at 391.
205. Id. at 398.
206. Id.
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the path for things to come and represented the unfortunate history of
our legal system's treatment of women.
B. Steps in the Right Direction ....
As time passed, the Court managed to consider women as more
than just child-bearing objects whose protection is necessary in order
to ensure humanity's "strength and vigor" or "future well-being. 20 7
When the Court considers the perspective of women, and remains
cognizant of the recent developments in sociology and psychology, as
it did in regard to race with Brown v. Board of Education,20 8 it is
capable of great strides forward.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. was an early example of the
Court reluctantly using the law to address and weaken gender
stereotypes.20 9 In Phillips, the plaintiff, a woman, contended that
Martin Marietta Corporation engaged in gender-discriminatory hiring
practices by refusing to accept applications from women with pre-
school-age children while simultaneously employing men with pre-
school-age children. 10 The Court agreed, finding that Title VII did
not permit one hiring policy for men and another, separate, policy for
women.211  Martin Marietta's hiring policy adhered to gender
stereotypes, framing women as homemakers and mothers and men as
bread-winners, and the Court rebuffed those stereotypes.
However, the Court was not completely unequivocal in its ruling.
It suggested that "conflicting family obligations" could qualify as
"bona fide occupational qualification[s]. 212 It was unable to wholly
discard perceived gender roles. Only Justice Marshall was bold
enough to be so explicit, accusing the majority of falling "into the
trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about the
proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. '213 He alone
maintained that gender stereotypes could not justify discriminatory
hiring practices.2"4
207. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421-22 (1908).
208. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). In finding that segregated educational facilities created a
deeply ingrained sense of inferiority that was "inherently unequal," the Court looked
at then-modem social science authorities, as discussed in its famous footnote 11. Id
at 494-95, 494 n.11.
209. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
210. Id. at543.
211. Id. at544.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
214. See id. ("Even characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes [are] not to
serve as predicates for restricting employment opportunity.").
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The Court further undermined long-held gender stereotypes in Reed
v. Reed,"5 a case on which future Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg
worked as an attorney.2 6 In Reed, the Court considered whether an
Idaho statute violated the Equal Protection Clause 7.21  The statute in
question determined the order of preference in the designation of an
individual to administer the estate of a person who died intestate.218
The precise language of the statute read that, "of several persons
claiming and equally entitled [under § 15-312] to administer, males
must be preferred to females ...
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause denies States the
authority to craft statutes that treat classes of people differently based
on arbitrary grounds "wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute.."220 This was the first time in United States history-almost
200 years after the nation was formed-that the Court ruled in favor
of a woman in an equal protection case.22' In the process, the Court
asked "whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for
letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state
objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of [the
statutes].''222 The Court tacitly acknowledged that there is no
difference between men and women when it comes to their
competency administering estates, and that bureaucratic convenience
did not trump equal protection.2 3 In making its decision, the Court
rejected the notion that women were incapable of handling financial
responsibilities as effectively as men.
In an opinion owing much to Reed, the Court finally recognized the
changing perception of gender roles in Stanton v. Stanton.224 In
Stanton, the Court found that a Utah statute setting the age of
majority for women at 18 and for men at 21 violated the Equal
215. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
216. See Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
217. Reed, 404 U.S. at 74.
218. Id. at 72-73.
219. Id. at 73 (alteration in original) (quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-312 (repealed 1972)).
220. Id. at 75-76.
221. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
222. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. This language eventually influenced the creation of the
"intermediate scrutiny" test laid out in Craig v. Boren. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-99 (1976) (citing Reed, 404 U.S. at 75) (describing the intermediate scrutiny
test).
223. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the statutes were
constitutional because they improved bureaucratic efficiency by eliminating hearings
on the merits of two or more petitioning relatives. Id. at 76.
224. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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Protection Clause.225 The lower court found the statute acceptable
because "it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and
that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he
assumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature earlier than
boys; and that females tend to marry earlier than males. 226  This
interpretation would have legitimized traditional gender roles, but the
Supreme Court disagreed. 27 Instead, it recognized that "[a] child,
male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male
for the marketplace and the world of ideas. '2 18 At long last, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that gender stereotypes are insufficient to
justify discriminatory treatment.229
Slightly over a decade later, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County,230 the Court moved from simply responding to
gender stereotypes to actually trying to address gender imbalance. In
Johnson, the petitioner challenged an affirmative action plan
developed by the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County,
California, which accounted for the gender of job applicants 3.2 1 The
petitioner claimed that this plan violated Title VII by impermissibly
taking gender into account.232 The Agency, however, argued it
needed the plan in order to address employment discrimination.233
The Agency further contended that "mere prohibition of
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects of past
practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of..
. women." 23 4 To achieve this equitable representation, the Agency
crafted a plan designed to proactively place women and other
minorities into positions where they were underrepresented.235
The Court upheld the Agency's plan as constitutional, praising it
for making progress in "eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in
the workplace. ' 23 6 This decision was anything but gender-neutral. It
225. Id. at 9, 17.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id. at 14-15.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 17.
230. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
231. Id. at 619.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 620 n.3.
234. Id. at 620 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 27, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616 (1987) (No. 85-1129)).
235. Id. at 620-21.
236. Id. at 642.
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intentionally condoned gender-sensitive hiring procedures when
those procedures sought to correct "a 'manifest imbalance' that
reflected underrepresentation of women in 'traditionally segregated
job categories.' 23 7 This was a huge step forward. Not only did the
Court acknowledge that there was a "manifest imbalance," but it
actually recognized that showing favoritism towards women was
necessary to counteract years of gender discrimination.238
Johnson also contained an ominous reference to gender-neutral
policy that would presage the direction the Court would take in the
future.239 In a fervent dissent, Justice Scalia admonished the Court
for "complet[ing] the process of converting [Title VII] from a
guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment
determinations, to a guarantee that it often will.' '24° In the dissent,
Justice Scalia seemed to accept gender-neutral policies, but was
appalled by the notion that policies might actually advance women's
positions in society.24' He reminded the Court that the Agency
designed its plan to correct gender discrimination due to the effects of
gender stereotypes in society, not to correct gender discrimination by
the Agency itself.2 42 This he saw as an insufficient reason to uphold
the Agency's plan.243 In the end, he accused the majority of
"impos[ing] . . . sexual tailoring that would, in defiance of normal
expectations and laws of probability, give each protected ... sexual
group a governmentally determined 'proper' proportion of each job
category. '24  In essence, Justice Scalia unwittingly laid out the
argument as to why gender-neutral policies are inadequate to do
anything more than ensure that the "manifest imbalance" does not get
any worse.
Justice Ginsburg answered Scalia's criticism another decade later,
in United States v. Virginia.245 In a majority opinion written by
237. Id. at 631 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
238. Id. at631,636.
239. Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. Id.
241. See id. ("[W]e effectively replace the goal of a discrimination-free society with the
quite incompatible goal of proportionate representation ... by sex in the workplace.").
242. See id. at 664 ("The most significant proposition of law established by today's
decision is that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when it is
intended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's own discrimination, but of
societal attitudes that have limited the entry of certain races, or of a particular sex, into
certain jobs.").
243. Id.
244. Id. at 660.
245. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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Justice Ginsburg and once again referring to Reed,246 the Court in
United States v. Virginia held that the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI) violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying admission to
women. 247  Justice Ginsburg made it clear when gender-based
classifications were, and were not, permissible:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to
promot[e] equal employment opportunity, [and] to advance
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people. But such classifications may not be used, as they
once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.248
This may be the high-water mark of Supreme Court jurisprudence
when it comes to recognizing the effect of society and the law on
gender roles and realizing the need for courts to take women's
perspectives into account. Not only did Ginsburg seek to ensure
equal protection; she actually sought to use the Court to ensure that
women received an "equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate
in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities. ' 249 Here, the Court made a proactive change designed to
improve the situation for women, and not just maintain the status
quo.
Once again, however, Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent
hinting at things to come. He called for the application of rational-
basis review, not intermediate scrutiny, to gender-based
classifications, and claimed that, since women "constitute a majority
of the electorate," they are more than capable of exerting political
power.250 He praised the "pride and distinction" with which VMI
served the people of Virginia and lamented the Court's rejection of
tradition." 1 He even went so far as to accuse the Court of "ignor[ing]
the history of our people. 25 2 He hearkened back to the nineteenth
century Court's language in Minor v. Happersett,253 absolving the
246. Id at 519, 532.
247. Id. at 519.
248. Id. at 533-34 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 532.
250. Id. at 574-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 566.
252. Id.
253. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Court from any obligation to affect positive change. 25 4 He stripped
agency from women, opining that just because some women might
want to attend VMI doesn't mean that all women should be permitted
to do so. 255  He pointed to the unsubstantiated "fact" that men and
women have "deep-seated" developmental differences. 2 6 He ended
his dissent by quoting, with great admiration, from a piece in a VMI
booklet entitled The Code of a Gentleman, which endorsed the very
gender-stereotypes that the majority addressed:
A Gentleman ....
Does not speak more than casually about his girl friend [sic]
Does not go to a lady's house if he is affected by alcohol...
Does not hail a lady from a club window.
A gentleman never discusses the merits or demerits of a lady
Does not slap strangers on the back nor so much as lay a
finger on a lady .... 257
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's dissent, like his dissent in
Johnson,258 heralded the future decisions of the Court.
254. Justice Scalia simultaneously abdicates judicial responsibility for improving the law
and places that responsibility with the people:
The virtue of a democratic system with a First Amendment is that
it readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what
they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws
accordingly. That system is destroyed if the smug assurances of
each age are removed from the democratic process and written
into the Constitution. So to counterbalance the Court's criticism
of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us
free to change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal
Court, which has embarked on a course of inscribing one after
another of the current preferences of the society (and in some
cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's
law-trained elite) into our Basic Law.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 579.
256. Id. at 576 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
257. Id. at 602-03.
258. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
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C. ... And Steps Backwards259
Justice Scalia's dissents in Johnson2 6' and United States v.
Virginia 61 demonstrate the gender-stereotyping undercurrent in the
courts that still exists today, despite the 123 years of advancement
between the eras of Bradwel1262 and United States v. Virginia.2 63 In
more recent years, the Court made several missteps, failing to
recognize when its rulings "create[d] or perpetuate[d] the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women. ' 264  Two cases which
exemplify this failure are Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S.265 and Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 266
In Nguyen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
applying differing requirements for a child to become a citizen of the
United States based on whether the child's citizen parent was male or
female.267 Under the statute in question, a child born to a citizen
mother outside of the United States and out of wedlock gains
citizenship if the mother had U.S. nationality at the time of the birth
and had been present in the United States for a continuous period of
at least one year.268  A child born to a citizen father outside of the
United States and out of wedlock, on the other hand, has several other
requirements to fulfill in order to become a citizen. 69  The Court
259. See also supra Part III.C.3 (describing the Supreme Court's ultimate ruling in Young).
260. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
264. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
265. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
266. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
267. 533 U.S. at 56-57.
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
269. Id. § 1409(a). These requirements include:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of
the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of
18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's
residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in
writing under oath, or
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found that the statute was constitutional, acknowledging that there is
a "significant difference" between a child's relationship with the
child's unmarried father and the child's unmarried mother.27°
This holding, in a majority opinion written by a man and not joined
by any of the women on the Court,271 validated stereotypical gender
roles in child-rearing. The Court found that it was an "important
governmental interest furthered in a substantial manner" that the
government "ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop.., a relationship..
that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States. '"272
The implication was that mothers, by necessity, will develop "real,
everyday ties that provide a connection [with the] child, 273 whereas
fathers are assumed not to develop such a relationship without some
form of written proof. This attitude lends legal legitimacy to the idea
that women are by nature nurturing, while men need to be coerced
into relationships with their own children.
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, "[tihere is no
reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers who are present at
birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar terms [with
mothers]. 274 She criticized the majority for denying opportunities to
individuals and ignoring our history of gender discrimination.275
These criticisms fell on deaf ears, however; it seems that in the 128
years since Bradwell, the Court hadn't entirely gotten past the idea
that "divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. 276
Even more recently, the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. 277 lent additional credence to long-standing notions about proper
gender roles. In Hobby Lobby, the Court found that it is an
unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion to require
closely held corporations to provide health insurance that covers
(C) the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court.
Id.
270. Nyugen, 533 U.S. at 62.
271. Id. at 56.
272. Id. at 64-65.
273. Id. at 65.
274. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 74.
276. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
277. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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contraception when the corporation holds sincere religious beliefs
opposing contraception.278 Once again, 79 the majority opinion was
written by a man, and none of the female members of the Court
joined the majority.280 Instead, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor joined
in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, 8' in which Justice Ginsburg repeatedly
emphasized that the majority's holding would have a disproportionate
impact on women.282 Justice Ginsburg noted that women have to pay
more than men for preventative care,283 citing a report showing the
increased burden on women resulting from excluding contraception
from health coverage.284 She stressed that "[t]he ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.
285
But the Hobby Lobby ruling not only ignored women's needs and
denied women agency; it actually placed men in a position of greater
advantage. The Court removed the contraception mandate, forcing
female employees of companies like Hobby Lobby to go elsewhere
for comprehensive health coverage.286 However, nothing in the
Hobby Lobby ruling affected insurance coverage for men's sexual
health; in fact, Hobby Lobby intends to continue offering insurance
covering erectile dysfunction treatments and vasectomies for male
employees.287 This hypocrisy may be staggering to some, but it
reflects enduring assumptions about traditional gender roles: society
perceives women as being destined for motherhood. 288 Men, on the
278. Id. at 2759.
279. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
280. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2758.
281. Id. Justice Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent as to all but Part III-C-1. Id.
282. See, e.g., id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In the Court's view, RFRA demands
accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter the impact that
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners'
religious faith-in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby
Lobby .. ") (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 2788.
284. Id. at 2789.
285. Id. at 2787-88 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992)).
286. See id. at 2787; see also id. at 2780-82 (majority opinion) (describing potential
alternative sources of contraception coverage for women).
287. Alexander C. Kaufman, Hobby Lobby Still Covers Vasectomies and Viagra,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/
30/hobby-lobby-viagran_5543916.html.
288. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)
("The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother.").
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other hand, are permitted, if not encouraged, to engage in as much
sexual promiscuity as they would like, sincere religious beliefs
notwithstanding, even if it cannot possibly result in pregnancy.
The rulings in Nguyen289 and Hobby Lobby9 ° might set a dangerous
precedent and indicate a step backwards by the Supreme Court, or
reveal a gender bias that has been festering under the surface for quite
some time. On the other hand, they may simply be outliers in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's holding in Young v. UPS does little to reveal
the path the Court may take in future. The Court gave Young another
opportunity to make a disparate treatment argument on a slightly
different basis, but it did not actually make a final determination,
instead leaving that up to the Fourth Circuit.29" ' Promisingly, the
Court ruled that an employer cannot use the fact that accommodating
pregnant employees would be expensive or inconvenient as
justification for differential treatment.292 It also clarified that when
Congress crafted the PDA in order to overturn General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,293 it did so with the intention of preventing things like
General Electric's disability plan in that case, which "den[ied]
coverage to pregnant employees on a neutral basis.1294 The Court's
holding does not outright prohibit gender-neutral policy justifications,
but it does place those justifications in a negative light.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's ruling did not go far enough,
failing to determine whether employers are required to provide the
same accommodations to pregnant employees as they do for similarly
situated non-pregnant employees.295 It did not decide whether UPS
discriminated against Young based on her pregnancy.296 It even
limited its new approach to the disparate treatment analysis to the
context of cases involving the PDA.297 The majority opinion barely
even mentioned the long history of gender discrimination and
stereotyping in our justice system. 298 The Court focused almost
289. See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
291. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356, (2015).
292. Id. at 1354.
293. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
294. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.
295. Id. at 1350.
296. Id. at 1356.
297. Id. at 1354-55.
298. Compare id. at 1343-56 with id. at 1367 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Vol. 45
entirely on statutory interpretation, and avoided making any policy
decisions.299
The only acknowledgement of the negative repercussions of gender
stereotyping ironically appeared in Justice Kennedy's dissent. 00
Despite his recognition that, even today, "pregnant employees
continue to be disadvantaged-and discriminated against-in the
workplace,"301 Kennedy failed to see where Young could "point to a
class of her co-workers that was accommodated and that would
include her but for the particular limitations imposed by her
pregnancy."30  He at least demonstrated awareness that
discriminatory treatment of women in the workplace is the result, in
part, of harmful gender stereotyping.30 3
Justice Scalia's dissent, on the other hand, not only failed to
acknowledge the disadvantages that women face in the workplace,
but doubled down on the approval of gender-neutral policy.30 4 Scalia
completely rejected the notion of trying to view the situation from a
woman's perspective, arguing that the PDA "does not prohibit
denying pregnant women accommodations, or any other benefit for
that matter, on the basis of an evenhanded policy."30 5 It would be
generous to assume that he simply did not realize that he is espousing
an "evenhanded policy" from a male perspective. He went on to
reject the very idea that the Supreme Court should take policy
considerations into account or attempt to do anything more than
"choose the best possible reading of the law,"30 6 hearkening back to
the language in Bradwel0 7 and Happersett.3 °8 There is a schism in
the Court currently, and it remains to be seen whether the Court will
make an effort to include women's perspectives, as it did in cases like
U.S. v. Virginia,°9 or whether it will undermine the progress it has
299. Id at 1349-50 (majority opinion).
300. Id. at 1366-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 1367.
302. Id. at 1366.
303. Id. at 1367.
304. See id. at 1362 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If a pregnant woman is denied an
accommodation under a policy that does not discriminate against pregnancy, she has
been 'treated the same' as everyone else.").
305. Id. at 1363.
306. Id. at 1366.
307. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
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made with rulings like those in Nguyen v. V.N.S.31 ° or Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.311
V. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND THE
NEED FOR A DIVERSE PERSPECTIVE IN THE LAW
Social scientists recognized some time ago that gender is a social
construction. 1 2 Gender does not occur independently, in a vacuum,
but is the result of historical, cultural, and other environmental
factors.313 Whenever we encounter a new person, we ascribe a
gender to the person based on certain social cues embedded within
our culture.314 By default, Americans will attribute maleness to
someone unless they make a determination to the contrary.3"5 In such
an androcentric system, women are inherently the "Other."'3 16
Our culture, and by extension, our legal system, adopts the
perspective of the white male as "normal," the "self' from which the
Other is viewed. Gender is developed through interaction within the
framework of our social structure.317 Our language reinforces gender
norms through the use of gendered pronouns and certain concepts,
like masculinity and femininity.31 8 Gender carries with it status
values and stereotypes.3"9 Gender has its "own distinctive set of
stereotypical traits... but also shares with other status characteristics
beliefs of greater competence in those with more valued states of the
characteristic. For instance, men are widely judged more generally
competent than women . . . despite other differences between the
stereotypes."320
In this manner, our legal system both reflects and shapes our view
of gender. When the Court discusses "[t]he natural and proper
310. See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 277-88 and accompanying text.
312. MARGARET L. ANDERSON & PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER: AN
ANTHOLOGY, 62-63 (8th ed. 2013).
313. Id.
314. Betsy Lucal, What It Means to Be Gendered Me: Life on the Boundaries of a
Dichotomous Gender System, 13 GENDER & SOC'Y 781, 783 (1999).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC'Y 125, 147
(1987).
318. Liz Bondi, In Whose Words? On Gender Identities, Knowledge and Writing Practices,
22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 245,254 (1997).
319. Cecilia Ridgeway, The Social Construction of Status Value: Gender and Other
Nominal Characteristics, 70 Soc. FORCES 367,368-69 (1991).
320. Id. at 369.
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timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex, 32 1 it isn't just
echoing the sentiment of the time; it is making a normative statement
with a real social impact. Gender-neutral policies are the
contemporary equivalent of those normative statements. Gender-
neutral policies serve only to maintain the status quo; when gender is
ignored, no advancements for women can be made.
If our country had strictly adhered to gender-neutral policies in the
past, women would have no right to vote.3 22 Women with pre-school-
age children could legally be passed over for employment, even when
men with pre-school-age children were not.3 23  Men could be
preferred to women when it comes to administering the estate of a
person who died intestate.324 The law would endorse the view that
women ought to be homemakers and child-rearers.325 It would be
unconstitutional to take actions to fix gender imbalance in
employment.32 6 Women could legally be excluded from prestigious
institutions of higher education.3 27 All of the advances that women
have made over the last century would be eliminated because our
courts would not be able to consider gender. In the words of Justice
Scalia, it would be up to "the people, over time, to be persuaded that
what they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws
accordingly," not the courts.328
The courts should actively embrace diverse perspectives when it
comes to gender-related decisions, and endeavor to avoid the fallacy
of gender-neutral policies. Gender is "a continuous, variable, and
tenacious process that, while usually leading to women's
disadvantage, is challenged, negotiated, subverted, and resisted.13 29
321. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
322. See Minor v. Happersctt, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875) ("[T]he Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone, and that the constitutions and
laws of several States which commit that important trust to mean alone are not
necessary void ....").
323. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (per curiam).
324. See Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73-74 (1971).
325. Cf Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ("No longer is the female destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas.").
326. Cf Johnson v. Transp. Agency 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (holding that sex may be
taken into consideration as one factor of a valid affirmative action plan).
327. Cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) ("[T]he Constitution's equal
protection guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique
educational opportunities VMI affords.").
328. Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. Sally J. Kenney, New Research on Gendered Political Institutions, 49 POL. RES. Q.
445, 445 (1996).
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Even UPS eventually saw the error of its ways and amended its
policy, offering light-duty accommodations to pregnant employees. 330
This came too late for Young,"' but it doesn't have to be too late for
the rest of the women in this country, as long as the courts eschew
their preference for gender-neutral policies. When the courts take a
gender-neutral position, they only reinforce the existing social
situation-a situation in which women are very much disadvantaged.
We have risen too far as a society to afford to fall so far down.
330. Brigid Schulte, With Supreme Court Case Pending, UPS Reverses Policy on Pregnant
Workers, WASH. POST BLOGS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
she-the-people/wp/2014/10/29/with-supreme-court-case-pending-ups-reverses-policy-
on-pregnant-workers/.
331. In fact, UPS did not announce the policy change until it filed its brief with the
Supreme Court. Id.
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